

emotions in themselves not sufficient to direct our actions ? If so, why should we complicate the study of man by supposing him to be actuated by cryptic impulses ? There is a fourfold reply to this objection. In the first place, pleasure and pain—unless the meaning of the terms is distorted—will not account for numberless peculiarities of behaviour. What pleasure, in the proper sense of the word, is there in self-sacrifice, cruelty, kindness, or asceticism : in venerating a king, or in deferring to a majority ? The pleasure, it may be replied, of satisfying an impulse. But this conceals the existence of impulses. Secondly, these feelings do not affect the current of our sub-conscious life, our reflex and ideomotor actions and the all-important functioning of our vital organs. These must be guided by forces which arouse no emotions, and we can hardly suppose that these forces cease to act upon our conscious life. Thirdly, when opposed to a masterful impulse, pleasure and pain may not move us at all. Human behaviour abounds in instances of absolute disregard of physical pain. What will not be endured by a mother's love, a soldier's courage, the self-repression of an ascetic ! Finally, pleasure and pain cannot be *original* guides to behaviour, since until the consequences of an action have been learnt by experience or instruction, we cannot know whether it will give one or the other. A child will

heedlessly grasp
at a wasp. Our feelings most certainly
influence
our conduct : memories of them
persist, actual
or symbolic,¹ and move us to repeat or
avoid an
experience. That is to say, pleasure
and pain,
while not original impulses, are
powerful stimuli
to the formation of habits.

¹ That is to say, memories of what we have been
told about
them.